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Central Asia today holds much 
strategic interest for India as an 
emerging 21st Century regional 
and global power. Despite being 
a latecomer in what some see as 
a new ‘Great Game’, New Delhi 
is keen to reconstruct the ‘Silk 
Route’. While Indo-Central Asian 
relations go back to antiquity when 
cultural, commercial and political 
ties thrived, post-independence 
India was physically cut off from 
Afghanistan and West Asia. It 
remained embroiled in domestic 
preoccupations and the insurgency 
in Jammu and Kashmir, all of which 
led to a limited foreign policy until 
the early nineties and a belated 
rediscovery of the region.
Central Asia today figures strongly on 
India’s geostrategic radar in terms of 
energy, security, trade and strategic 
influence. New Delhi’s pragmatic 
foreign policy sees it as a responsibility 
of India’s to shape its region, driven 
by self-interest but packaged in 
terms of mutual benefit, particularly 
in regard to non-interference in state 
sovereignty. This Nehruvian ideal 
matches the views of Central Asian 
leaders who in turn see India as a non-
reformist power that shares crucial 
strategic objectives (stabilisation in 
Afghanistan, combating religious 
extremism, terrorism and drug-
trafficking). Indian culture and the 
Bollywood film industry hold much 
appeal too. Added to a history of non-
violence, India enjoys much prestige 
in the region.
Like other actors, New Delhi’s strategic 
interests lie principally in securing 
energy sources (hydrocarbons, oil, 
gas, uranium) to spur growth and 
sustain the country’s rapid economic 
rise. India is keen on tapping into 
Kazakhstan’s oil resources having 
acquired, through its energy 
corporation ONGC Videsh, a 15 per 
cent ownership stake in the Alibekmola 
oil field; a 25 per cent stake in the 
offshore Satpaev exploration bloc; 
and a $1.5 billion investment in the 
joint Russian-Kazakh Kurmangazy oil 
field in the Caspian Sea. Through the 
Indo-Kazakh civil nuclear cooperation 
agreement Astana will supply 2,100 
tonnes of uranium to India by 2014. 
However, by 2020, India will need 
8,000 tonnes of uranium a year if it is 
to feed its estimated 40 nuclear power 
plants. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) reckons that India’s 
hydrocarbon consumption will grow 
from the current 3-3.5 million barrels 
per day to over 5 million in 2020.
India would like to purchase Turkmen 
gas as well as Uzbek and Kazakh 
hydrocarbon resources, and is willing 
to explore hydro-power possibilities 
from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. But 
the principal concern is transportation 
from Central Asia to Indian markets. To 
take one example, the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas 
pipeline would have to pass through 
war-torn Afghanistan and India’s arch-
rival Pakistan. The same problems 
threaten projects aimed at transporting 
Tajik and Kyrgyz electricity to India.
Besides securing reliable energy 
supplies and trade, India and Central 
Asia share a common vision for 
the region. This is particularly true 
with regard to the stabilisation of 
Afghanistan, where India has a 
history of development aid, medical 
assistance and cultural ties. New 
Delhi sees Afghanistan as a potential 
hub for energy, trade and transit, 
linking Central Asia to South Asia, 
and as a latent corridor to Iran and 
the Middle East. For their part the 
Central Asian republics seek secular 
India’s cooperation to combat the 
growing threat of religious extremism, 
violence, terrorism and arms and 
drugs trafficking, as Pakistan does 
not appear a particularly appealing 
partner for historic reasons. 
India has also been engaged in 
limited defence cooperation whilst 
largely keeping to its policy of non-
intervention. Such projects have 
included training senior level Kyrgyz 
personnel in some of India’s top 
military establishments. Tajikistan in 
particular is attractive to India as it 
provides headway into Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. India’s refurbishment 
of the Ayni airbase in 2002 gave the 
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impression that it had secured its first 
foreign military base, however in 2010 
New Delhi handed it back to the Tajik 
defence ministry. 
In the complex web of relationships, 
India must balance the power-play 
between various actors in Central 
Asia – Russia and China, as well 
as the EU, the US, Pakistan, Iran 
and Turkey. It has followed two 
intersecting approaches: cooperation 
and competition. 
India shares the concerns of China 
and Russia in regard to energy 
interests, Afghanistan, regional 
security and combating radical Islam. 
Like Russia and China, it does not 
promote democracy and human rights 
in the region. However, Russia is keen 
on balancing India against China, 
as are the Central Asian republics. 
India in turn offers the Central Asian 
republics an opportunity to reduce 
their dependence on Moscow. 
China and India strive for the same 
objectives of securing geoeconomic 
and geostrategic influence. In addition, 
China’s deepening relationship with 
Pakistan is also a concern for India. 
Although both China and India agree 
that there is enough room for both 
to develop without strict competition, 
they will continue to remain cautious 
of each other, particularly as India’s 
economic activities in Central Asia 
remain small compared to those of 
China. Overall, on economic matters 
all three ‘giants’ operate with a safe 
distance between them.
India’s involvement in existing regional 
security frameworks is welcomed 
by the Central Asian republics and 
promoted by Russia through the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO). In response China is pushing 
for Pakistan’s membership in the 
organisation. Both India and Pakistan 
gained observer status in July 2005, 
and India applied for full membership 
last year. But the SCO has little potential 
to operate effectively as a regional 
organisation for cooperation because 
it is often split between Russia’s aim 
of strengthening its strategic presence 
in the region and China’s plans for 
economic development. Entry of the 
India-Pakistan rivalry into the equation 
could render the SCO even more 
impotent. In light of the US and NATO 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, there 
might be room for the SCO to play 
a bigger role concerning its stability. 
This would be in India’s interest, but 
New Delhi does not want to jeopardise 
its new-found friendship with the US 
by aligning itself fully with the SCO. 
This is especially true since the SCO 
is largely unproven, and has yet to 
effectively engage in crisis response 
operations; it remains unclear whether 
the organisation has the mechanisms 
or mandate to do so.
Growing Indo-US relations have 
fostered greater understanding 
between the two especially on regional 
matters and increasingly so vis-à-vis 
Pakistan. In contrast, understanding 
and cooperation between the EU and 
India on regional (South Asian) matters 
is limited to occasional discussions: they 
rarely discuss Central Asia. In foreign 
affairs, New Delhi prefers to act alone 
and is not willing either to subscribe to 
any particular models or collaborate 
on them with Western actors. For 
instance, India is unwilling to engage 
actively in democracy promotion using 
sanctions or conditionality – Delhi 
believes it promotes democracy best 
by example. For India, engagement 
rather than isolation has been more 
effective, especially with authoritarian 
regimes where anti-India elements 
(such as insurgents) exist. The focus, it 
feels, should be placed on empowering 
civil society and education to bring 
about political development. India thus 
invites parliamentarians, diplomats 
and businessmen to visit its bustling 
Parliament and other politico-industrial 
venues, meet Indian politicians, the 
media and think-tanks. Over the years, 
there have also been educational 
exchanges between India and the 
Central Asian republics. 
India is aware of the potential of Iran’s 
geostrategic position as an export route 
for Central Asian energy and natural 
resources, and is therefore unwilling 
to support the EU’s tough stance on 
Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme. 
However, as ‘natural partners’, the EU 
and India nonetheless can find a lot of 
commonalities in their approach with 
plenty of opportunities for coordination. 
The U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan 
for example could be a ground for 
stimulating greater synergies between 
the EU and India on the one hand, 
and the Central Asian republics on the 
other. The recently launched EU-India 
foreign policy dialogue could be the 
perfect platform for such issues.
As India and her foreign policy 
continue to develop, there will be no 
escaping entanglement in Central 
Asia’s ‘Great Game’. With greater 
conspicuousness, India’s strategic 
presence in the Central Asian republics 
will be felt by other actors, increasing 
competition and adding new options 
for the Central Asian countries to 
diversify relations. India’s challenge 
lies in exploiting opportunities for 
cooperation with all relevant players in 
Central Asia while minimising friction 
so as to build a geopolitical niche in 
the region in order to fulfil its interests.
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